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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOHN QUAS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890601-CA

Priority No.

2

:

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON REHEARING AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did this Court properly apply the standard governing
refiling a criminal charge, as articulated in State v. Brickev,
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)?
Does this Court's analysis of the "plain error"
doctrine require clarification?
Should footnote 5 be deleted?
A petition for rehearing is justified when the
appellate court has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or
fact.

Utah R. App. P. 35(a);

Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157,

172-73, 129 P.2d 619, 624 (1913).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are
directly applicable to the resolution of defendant's petition for
rehearing.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(Supp. 1989) (R. 3). That charge was dismissed at the
preliminary hearing, the court determining that there was
insufficient evidence to bind defendant over to stand trial.

The

State refiled the charge, and, after a second preliminary
hearing, defendant was bound over for trial.
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder after a
jury trial (R. 589). Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of
five years to life at the Utah State Prison with an additional
term of one to five years for use of a firearm, to be served
consecutively with the other term (R. 600-01).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Facts pertinent to defendant's petition are included in
this Court's ruling, State v. Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah
Ct. App. June 18, 1991).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court's analysis under Brickev is sound and need
not be altered.

Application of the "other good cause" portion of

the Brickev standard, which encompasses a prosecutor's innocent
miscalculation of the quantum of evidence needed to sustain a
determination of probable cause, is as appropriate in the context
of a dismissal of charges as in a continuance of the preliminary
hearing.
The "plain error" analysis entered by this Court was
-2-

proper.

However, the sentence cited by defendant as confusing

properly could be deleted.
The State agrees with defendant's objection to this
Court's reliance on the docketing statement to preserve an issue
for appeal.

However, the remaining portion of the footnote is

proper and should not be deleted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS UNDER STATE V. BRICKEY IS
PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED.
In his petition for rehearing, defendant acknowledges
the standard for refiling a criminal charge, articulated in State
v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), and accepted by this Court
in the instant case.

That standard provides for refiling with Ma

showing of new or additional evidence or other good cause."
Brickev, 714 P.2d at 645; Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47.
However, he asks this Court to eliminate its analysis under the
"good cause" prong of Brickev, arguing, in part, that this Court
has equated "good cause" with prosecutorial "good faith." (Pet.
of Appellant at 2). However, this Court did not equate the two,
but stated that "good cause may include cases where a prosecutor
miscalculated the quantum of evidence needed to bind over and the
ensuing further investigation was not performed to procrastinate,
harass, or shop for a more favorable magistrate."

Ouas, 163 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 47 (citing Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647). That
statement is wholly consistent with Brickev and should remain.
Defendant acknowledges that Brickev does not
-3-

distinguish between a continuance and refiling.

(Pet, of

Appellant at 2). However, he also argues that "[i]f the
prosecutor miscalculates the quantum of evidence necessary to
sustain a finding of probable cause, the magistrate should allow
a reasonable continuance for the collection of evidence that is
reasonably available, and which continuance would not cause undue
delay." (Pet. of Appellant at 3-4). In making that argument,
defendant does not explain how a prosecutor can determine, prior
to the magistrate's ruling, whether or not the charges are going
to be dismissed, how a prosecutor has the authority to "allow a
case to be dismissed" or why a continuance is preferable to
refiling, since they are governed by the same standard.

His

argument should be rejected.
Defendant further argues that this Court accepted,
without scrutiny, the magistrate's finding of "new or previously
unavailable" evidence at the second preliminary hearing on the
basis that defendant did not marshal the evidence.
ignores this Court's analysis.

That argument

This Court properly exercised its

appellate function, stating that it would not overturn the trial
court's findings absent clear error, found that defendant had not
borne its burden of marshaling the evidence in attacking the
trial court's determination, and accepted the trial court's
findings.

Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 48.
Defendant asserts that he did marshal the evidence, by

noting the "only" evidence that he believes satisfies the Brickev
standard. (Pet. of Appellant at 6). He does not have the option
-4-

to include only the evidence favorable to his theory of the case.
In so marshaling, he does admit some confusion about what
"marshalling the evidence" requires-

Id. at 6-7.

As this Court

stated in the instant case, "the appellant 'must marshal all of
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack.'"

Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47

(quoting State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990)).
Thus, marshaling the evidence is a two part process.

First, a

defendant must state all of the evidence that supports the trial
court's ruling.

In the instant case, pertinent evidence would

include the twelve new exhibits and five new witnesses.

Second,

once defendant has marshaled all the evidence, he or she must
demonstrate that the evidence, including reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from that evidence, is insufficient to support
the trial court's findings.

In the instant case, defendant has

done neither.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that this Court
overlooked or misapprehended either fact or law in its Brickev
analysis, and his arguments should be rejected.
POINT II
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSION OF
CERTAIN EVIDENCE UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR
DOCTRINE IS CORRECT, AND THE SENTENCE
DEFENDANT OBJECTS TO COULD BE DELETED AS
SUPERFLUOUS.
Defendant argues that the following sentence mixes the
-5-

two prongs of the "plain error" test1:
Third, even if the remark were prejudicial,
it was not sufficiently obvious to invoke the
plain error exception, especially in light of
the corroborating evidence offered by this
and other witnesses.
Quas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49. The State agrees with defendant
that the final phrase of the sentence goes to the issue of
prejudice, not to the question of obviousness.
To clarify the statement, defendant requests that this
Court specify which corroborating evidence it relied on in
reaching its conclusion.

However, this Court found no obvious

error in Dr. Grey's testimony.

Therefore, the prejudice prong of

the plain error test need not be reached.

Accordingly, the

sentence defendant objects to is superfluous and could be
deleted.
POINT III
FOOTNOTE 5 SHOULD BE MODIFIED BY DELETING THE
PORTION CONCERNING THE DOCKETING STATEMENT.
The State agrees with defendant that footnote 5 could
be modified.

Specifically, the State agrees that issues not

raised in the docketing statement should not be deemed waived on
appeal.

The purpose of the docketing statement is not to outline

every conceivable issue that the court might choose or decline to

1

In State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35, cert, denied, 110
S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court established a two-part
test to determine plain error. First, the error must be "plain,"
that is, from examination of the record it should be obvious that
the court was committing error. Second, the error must have
affected the substantial rights of the defendant, that is, the
error must have been harmful. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d).
-6-

address.

Utah R. App. P. 9(b) ("The docketing statement is not a

brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions.••).
Cf. Nunlev v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah
1964) ("[T]he object of a notice of appeal is to advise the
opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific
judgment in a particular case.").

Therefore, the State does not

object to the deletion of the portion of the footnote that
discusses the docketing statement.
However, the Court's reliance on State v. Humphrey, 794
P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, granted, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah
1990), to resolve the issue of the appellate jurisdiction of the
district court is appropriate.

That case is dispositive of the

jurisdiction issue, and that portion of the footnote should not
be changed.

The footnote, therefore, could be modified, as

follows:
In his brief, appellant asks us to consider
issues surrounding the court's interlocutory
order to bind him over for trial, including
whether the district court had jurisdiction
to review the circuit court's decision to
bind over. We have already disposed of the
jurisdictional issue in State v. Humphrey,
794 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah App.), cert, granted,
150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1990).
Thus modified, it could be moved from the Court's discussion of
expert testimony and placed following the sentence, "The trial
court granted the State's motion on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence presented at
the preliminary hearing."

163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47. These

modifications both address defendant's concerns about the proper
-7-

role of a docketing statement and reflect this Court's proper
reliance on Humphrey.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should amend its
opinion and deny defendant's petition for rehearing.
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^

day of August, 1991.
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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